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DETERMINANTS OF THE SETTLEMENT
AMOUNT IN SECURITIES FRAUD
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
John D. Finnerty* and Gautam Goswami**
I. INTRODUCTION
The estimation of damages in securities fraud-on-the-market class
action lawsuits has generated an extensive legal and economics literature.l
These studies generally focus on measuring the aggregate amount of
damages shareholders incurred during the class period due to the fraud
under various assumptions concerning, first, the inflation in the firm's
share price as a direct result of the fraud, and second, the trading behavior
* Managing Principal, Finnerty Economic Consulting, LLC. Professor of Finance,
Fordham University.
** Associate Professor of Finance, Fordham University. John D. Finnerty and Gautam
Goswami would like to thank H. Acharya, S. Gopinath, Pablo Alfaro, Jeffrey Yung, and
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1. See, e.g., John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for
Measuring Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J. Bus. & FrN. 213 (2003);
William M. Bassin, A Two Trader Population Share Retention Model for Estimating
Damages in Shareholder Class Action Litigations, 6 STAN. J. Bus. & FrN. 49 (2000);
William. H. Beaver et al., Stock Trading Behavior and Damage Estimation in Securities
Cases, Cornerstone Research (1997), http://www.comerstone.com/pdfs/stocktr.pdf;
William H. Beaver & James K. Malernee, Estimating Damages in Securities Fraud Cases,
Cornerstone Research (1990), http://www.cornerstone.con/framres.html; Kenneth R. Cone
& James E. Laurence, How Accurate Are Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities
Fraud Cases?, 49 Bus. LAW. 505 (1994); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using
Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REv. 883
(1990); Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Rule 10b-5 Damage Computation: Applications of
Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 838 (1983); Dean
Furbush & Jeffrey W. Smith, Estimating the Number of Damaged Shares in Securities
Fraud Litigation: An Introduction to Stock Trading Models, 49 Bus. LAW. 527 (1994); Jon
Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule lob-5 for
Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 811 (1991); Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M.
Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545 (1994); Richard W. Simmons &
Richard C. Hoyt, Economic Damage Analysis in Rule lOb-5 Securities Litigations, 3 J.
LEGAL. ECON. 71 (1993); and Charles H. Steen, The Econometrics of Fraud-on-the-Market
Securities Fraud, 4 J. LEGAL. ECON. 11 (1994).
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of shareholders, which transforms the share price inflation into losses on
the shares purchased at inflated prices during the class period. These
models provide only an estimate of the aggregate damages because the
actual damages (both per share and in the aggregate) can be determined
only after shareholder damage claims are collected and verified.
The emphasis placed on damage modeling may mask the other
important factors that determine the amount of compensation shareholders
who have been damaged by the fraud ultimately receive. The vast majority
of securities fraud class actions settle before trial, 2 and the settlement
amounts are usually substantially less than the amounts the plaintiffs'
damage models estimate. 3 The damage model estimates are, as we show in
this article, a useful starting point for settlement negotiations because the
estimated damage amount is the single most important factor explaining the
settlement amount.4  However, there are several other factors that also
affect the final settlement amount. Nevertheless, the determinants of these
settlement amounts have to date received scant attention in the legal and
economics literature. We have found one law review article that describes
several factors that appear to affect the settlement amount, 5 a second law
review article that documents a significant relationship between the
settlement amount and potential damages in initial public offering class
actions,6 and two unpublished working papers. 7 However, we are not aware
2. See A. C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of
Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (University of
Michigan, John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-011, 2003),
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstractid=439503.
3. We provide settlement data for 525 securities fraud class actions in this article, which
indicate that the settlement amount averages approximately 3.60% of the model damages.
4. Researchers have found a direct relationship between the settlement amount and
estimated damages, although the relationship is not linear. See Jennifer Francis et. al.,
Determinants and Outcomes in Class Action Securities Litigation (University of Chicago,
Graduate School of Business, Working Paper, 1994). See also James Bohn & Stephen Choi,
Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 903 (1996).
5. See Mukesh Bajaj et. al., Securities Class Action Settlement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
1001 (2003). This article does not statistically test the significance of the factors it
identifies.
6. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 4.
7. See Francis et al., supra note 4. See also Laura E. Simmons, Post-Reform Act
Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported through December 2001 (Cornerstone Research
Monograph, 2002), at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-
2001/Settlements.pdf. Simmons's monograph does not statistically test the significance of
the factors it identifies.
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of any published research that statistically determines which factors are
most important in explaining the dollar settlement amount.
This article attempts to fill that void. It identifies the factors most
responsible for determining the settlement amount. It also develops a
settlement model that incorporates these factors. We analyze a sample
consisting of 525 securities fraud class action settlements that were reached
between 1994 and 2005. 8 We identify the main drivers of the observed
settlement amounts and develop a settlement model that explains more than
56% of the settlement amounts in terms of these settlement drivers. The
settlement model should be useful to counsel or interested parties for
gauging a reasonable settlement amount consistent with past experience. It
should also be of interest to legal scholars because it identifies a set of
factors that affect the settlement amount and quantifies their relative impact
on the settlement amount for an important set of class actions. Our
modeling technique could be applied to other types of class action (or
other) litigation to estimate similar models to aid in the litigation settlement
process.
II. BACKGROUND
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")9 regulates
securities transactions and the disclosure of information after the securities
are issued to investors in the public securities market. It requires public
firms to make regular quarterly filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and prohibits material misstatements in or material
omissions from these documents. Examples of material misstatements that
are typically alleged in securities fraud class actions include the
overstatement of revenues and the understatement of expenses, both of
which are often alleged to be the result of improper accounting practices.
Likewise, alleged omissions typically involve the failure to disclose likely
8. Our sample originally consisted of 525 class action settlements, including the
settlement of the Cendant class action litigation. In Re Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation,
109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. N.J. 2000). The size of that settlement ($3.2 billion) caused it to
have a disproportionate impact on our statistical test results, so we initially excluded it from
the bivariate statistical tests as an outlier. However, we also compare the final settlement
model with and without the Cendant case and show that it has only a small impact on the
parameter estimates.
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
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or known material adverse impacts on revenues, profits, or costs. Rule
1Ob-5 under the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for an issuer of public
securities "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."
A material fact is an item of information that a rational investor would find
useful in order to make a well-informed purchase or sale decision.
The Exchange Act-as well as the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act") 10-provide for recovery of damages by investors who have been
injured by securities fraud. The intent is to make the plaintiffs "whole" by
restoring them to the same economic position they would be in but for the
fraud. This can be accomplished by undoing the tainted transaction (e.g.,
through rescission under the Securities Act) or by making a cash payment
sufficient to compensate investors fully for their losses, which is the usual
remedy in lOb-5 cases.
The Exchange Act does not specify any measure of damages, leaving it
to the court's discretion to determine the appropriate measure of damages.
Most of the damages measures that have been employed in 1 Ob-5 cases use
the plaintiffs' injury as the basis for the calculation, although some use the
defendant's gain. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA") includes guidelines for estimating securities fraud damages
under both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act.11 The most relevant
aspect of the PSLRA to the measurement of damages in securities fraud
class actions is the "90-day bounceback" provision, which limits the extent
of damages where the stock price quickly rebounds after a corrective
disclosure. 
12
10. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
11. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 202 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12. Id. ("In any private action arising under this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.] in which
the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price of a security, if the
plaintiff sells or repurchases the subject security prior to the expiration of the 90-day period
described in paragraph (1), the plaintiffs damages shall not exceed the difference between
the purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the security
and the mean trading price of the security during the period beginning immediately after
dissemination of information correcting the misstatement or omission and ending on the
date on which the plaintiff sells or repurchases the security.")
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B. DAMAGE MODELS
Total damages in fraud-on-the-market class action matters are a function
of (1) the per-share price inflation that results from the fraud 13 and (2) the
volume and timing of shares traded. Damages depend on these two key
determinants. First, what is the impact of the fraud on the issuer's share price?
Specifically, by how much and over what time period is the share price
inflated? Second, how much damage was caused by the price distortion? How
many shares were bought and sold at distorted prices, and what was the net
effect of the purchases and sales at distorted prices on the plaintiffs?
The proper determination of damages in such cases therefore requires
(1) an accurate measure of the distortion in share prices directly resulting
from the fraud and (2) an accurate model of shareholder trading behavior to
calculate the impact of the distortion in the share price on securities
purchasers. 14  This latter factor is where the different securities fraud
trading models differ.
The damages calculation depends on at least six critical factors:
" The length of the damage period;
* The difference between the actual security prices during the damage
period and the security prices that would have existed had the fraud
not occurred (referred to as the "but-for prices" or the "value line");
" The number of affected shares, which depends on the size of the
public share float, or the number of outstanding shares minus the
number of shares that are not eligible for damages;
" The number of distinct classes of investors and their relative trading
intensities, which determine how fast their share portfolios turn over;
* The initial distribution of share ownership among the different
classes of investors; and
" The transition probabilities that govern the rate(s) at which shares
move from one class of shareholders to another. 15
13. Jon Kaslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule
1Ob-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FoRDAM L. REv. 811, 818 (1991).
14. Price distortion and share turnover both affect the amount of damages, but they can
be treated as separate components of the damage calculation.
15. Finnerty and Pushner, supra note 1, at 218.
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Plaintiff and defendant experts usually disagree concerning the
specification of one or more of these factors, as well as concerning the
choice of trading model. The different methods of measuring the degree of
share price inflation can lead the plaintiff expert to estimate damages that
are two (or more) times as great as the defendant expert's estimate, and the
different choices of trading model can similarly lead to a plaintiff damage
estimate that is double (or more) the defendant expert's damage estimate. 16
There are three competing damage theories and, as a result, three
fundamentally different trading models for calculating damages in fraud-
on-the-market class action matters. 17 The traditional approach, known as
the proportional trading model ("PTM"), assumes that every share is
equally likely to trade each day no matter how often or how seldom it has
traded in the past.18 According to the PTM, the holders of X percent of the
shares should account for X percent of the trading volume. 19 A second
approach, the accelerated trading model ("ATM"), assumes that shares that
have traded since the beginning of the damage period are more likely to
trade (again) than shares that have not traded since the beginning of the
damage period. The third approach, and in our view the most realistic
model of trading behavior, is the Two Trader Model ("TTM"). 2 1 The TTM
approach to calculating damages in securities fraud class actions assumes
that there are two different types of shareholders (e.g., investors and
traders), each with a different propensity to trade. The TTM can be
generalized to include more than two types of shareholders, and it can
include day traders as a subset of the class of traders. 22 The damage
settlement model we develop is potentially compatible with any of the three
trading models.
The issue concerning how much damage was caused by the share price
distortion centers on the choice of trading model because the model
determines when shares are (assumed to be) bought and sold (and at what
prices), which in turn determines the total number of shares damaged each
day during the class period. A recent article explains why the TTM is
superior to the PTM and to the ATM. 23 The empirical evidence regarding
16. Id, at 246.
17. Id. at 227.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 218.
22. Id. at 229.
23. Id.
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shareholder trading behavior is fully consistent with the TTM but not the
other two models.
24
The article also explains how the PTM is prone to overstate the amount of
damages resulting from securities fraud.25 Not surprisingly, plaintiff experts
usually choose the PTM. We find that they continue to use it notwithstanding
a recent federal district court ruling in Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., which found
that the PTM "does not meet any of the Daubert standards. 26 Because
plaintiffs' experts generally use the PTM to estimate the theoretical amount of
damages, we use the damages estimated by applying the PTM as one of the
explanatory variables in our settlement model.
Perhaps reflecting the uncertainties inherent in litigating complex
securities matters and the wide gulf between plaintiff and defendant damage
model estimates, the vast majority of class action lawsuits settle before going
to trial. The settlement amount is normally determined through negotiation
between counsels for the affected parties and then submitted for court
approval. While the settlement models are not determinative of the final
settlement amounts, the model-generated damage estimate appears to be an
important item of information in the settlement process. We find that the
PTM damage estimate is the single most important explanatory variable,
which is consistent with plaintiffs' counsel taking such estimates into
account when negotiating securities fraud class action settlements.
III. THE SAMPLE OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
We obtained a sample of 525 federal securities fraud class action
settlements from the Securities Class Action Services database and theS 27
Stanford Law School database on class action litigations. The settlements
were reached between 1994 and 2005 in connection with class actions filed
24. Id. at 230. See also Bassin, supra note 1. We also believe that of the three types of
models, only the TTM is capable of meeting the Daubert standard for the admissibility of
scientific evidence.
25. See Finnerty & Pushner, supra note 1, at 244.
26. The Kaufman court went on to find that the PTM "has never been tested against
reality.., has never been accepted by professional economists" and that it is a "theory
developed more for securities litigation than anything else." Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. 95-C1069, 2000 WL 1506892, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000). Nevertheless, the PTM
still has its defenders. See Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, Complex Litigation at the
Millennium: A Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate Damages in
Securities Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2001).
27. Securities Class Action Services are a part of Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS).
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between 1994 and 2003. Table 1 provides descriptive data by filing year
and also by settlement year. Panel A provides the distribution of filings
and settlements year by year in our sample. The average elapsed time
between filing and settlement is 2.8 years, the longest elapsed period is
eleven years for one case that was filed in 1994 and settled in 2005, and
eighty-six (16%) of the 525 cases for which we have the settlement year
took four years or longer to settle.
28
Panel B describes the sample by filing year. We exclude the Cendant
settlement from Panels B and C because its unusually large size would
distort the averages. 29 About two-thirds of the cases were filed between
1997 and 2001. Forty of the cases were filed before January 1, 1996, the
effective date of the PSLRA. The average settlement amount is $20.13
million, which is almost quadruple the median settlement amount of $5.25
million. The average settlement amount exceeds the median settlement
amount because the distribution of settlements is skewed by some very
large settlements. 31 Cases filed in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2003
resulted in an average settlement amount that is statistically significantly
less than the average settlement amount for the cases filed in the other
years. Only thie cases filed in 2002 resulted in an average settlement
amount that is statistically significantly greater than the other years'
average settlement amount.
Panel C describes the sample by settlement year. More than 70%
occurred between 2000 and 2004. Cases settled in 1996, 1998, 2000, and
2002 resulted in an average settlement amount that is statistically
significantly less than the average settlement amount for the other years in
the sample. Only the cases settled in 2005 resulted in an average
settlement amount that is statistically significantly greater than the other
years' average settlement amount.
28. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1009 (finding that settlements generally take longer to
achieve post-PSLRA).
29. See supra note 8. We included the Cendant settlement in our estimation of the
settlement model. See infra Table 9.
30. The average settlement amount including the Cendant settlement is $26,190,000.
31. This skew is even more evident when the average is calculated including the Cendant
settlement.
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IV. FACTORS AFFECTING SETTLEMENTS
A. PLAINTIFFS' POTENTIAL DAMAGES
The settlement amount depends on the amount of loss shareholders
incurred as a direct result of the fraud. Prior research has documented a
direct relationship between the settlement amount and the aggregate
amount of damages plaintiffs incurred as estimated by the PTM or some
other standard damage model. We use the PTM together with the S&P
500 Index to adjust for market-wide stock price movements during the
class period.33
Table 2 furnishes the average annual ratio of the settlement amount to
the estimated aggregate damages for each year between 1995 and 2005.
We calculate the arithmetic average of these ratios and also the weighted
average of these ratios using the plaintiff-style damages ("PSD") as the
weights for each year. The weighted average of the ratios of the settlement
amount to the estimated aggregate damages during the year varies from a
low of 1.08% in 2004 to a high of 9.27% in 1996, with a median ratio of
3.76%. 3  The overall arithmetic average ratio for the eleven years is
11.19%. The overall weighted average of the ratios of the settlement
amount to the estimated aggregate damages is 3.60%. The average
aggregate estimated damages, based on the PSD estimate, are
$1,150,000,000. The average settlement amount and the average aggregate
estimated damages have both been trending upward.
The relationship between the settlement amount and the estimated
aggregate damage amount is not linear.35  After calculating the PTM
damage estimate for each settlement, we fitted a double logarithmic model
to capture the observed degree of nonlinearity.36 The regression coefficient
in the model measures the elasticity of the settlement amount with respect
32. See Francis, et al., supra note 4; Bajaj, et al., supra note 5, at 1016.
33. We use the version of the PTM described in Finnerty & Pushner, supra note 1, at 244.
34. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1031 (finding that the average ratio of the settlement
amount to the damage amount is between 4.96% and 16.60%, depending on how the
shareholders' potential total loss is measured).
35. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1017, (finding that the ratio of the settlement amount to
the estimated damages initially decreases steadily as the amount of damages rises and then
levels off).
36. Equation (1) assumes a linear relationship between percentage changes in these
amounts, which is different from a linear relationship between the absolute changes in the
two variables.
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to changes in the estimated damages (based on the PTM model). The
estimated relationship is
3 7
EQUATION (1)
logS, = 6.959 + 0.465logD. R 2 = 0.42
(12.28"**) (15.62"**)
In equation (1), Sn is the settlement amount, Dn is the aggregate
damage amount estimated by the PTM, and log is the natural logarithm.
Equation (1) indicates that the PTM damages estimate is capable of
explaining 42% of the settlement amount all by itself.3 8 It also implies that
a 10% increase in the estimated aggregate damages leads to a 4.65%
increase in the expected settlement amount. As we explain later in the
article, the PTM estimate of aggregate damages is the single most
important explanatory variable.
B. U.S. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
The U.S. judicial circuit in which the class action is filed can affect the
settlement amount. An empirical study of motions to dismiss following
passage of the PSLRA found significant differences in the pleading standards
in the Second and Ninth Circuits, which are the leading districts for the filing
of securities fraud class actions.3 9 The more demanding pleading standard in
the Ninth Circuit as compared to the Second Circuit should lead to a higher
average settlement amount in the Ninth Circuit.40 The higher pleading
standard should raise the cost of litigation for attorneys to pursue even those
claims that turn out to be meritorious, which should lead to greater selectivity
and raise the minimum damage amount threshold.4'
37. The regression results are summarized infra in Table 9 regression 1, where we report
that the regression constant 6.959 and the regression coefficient 0.465 are both significantly
different from zero.
38. The t-statistics, which are given in parentheses beneath the estimates, are both
significant at the 1% level. This means that there is less than a one in one hundred chance
that a t-statistic of 15.62 would occur if the amount of plaintiff-style damages has no effect
on the settlement amount.
39. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 2, at 17 (finding that the Ninth Circuit's reputation
as a more demanding venue for securities class actions is supported by a significantly higher
dismissal rate).
40. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions (UC Berkeley Public Law
Research Paper No. 528145, 2004), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.cfin?abstractid=528145.
41. Id.
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Table 3 describes the average settlement amounts by U.S. judicial
circuit. The Ninth and Second Circuits account for 25.57% (134 cases) and
18.51% (97 cases), respectively, of the 524 cases in our sample. No other
circuit accounts for 10% or more. The Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have an average settlement amount that is statistically significantly
less than the average settlement amount in the other circuits. The
settlements in several of the circuits exhibit a high degree of variability
(measured by the standard deviation of the settlement amount), especially
the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits.42
The average settlement amount for Ninth Circuit cases is less than the
average settlement amount for Second Circuit cases, which is the opposite
of what we expected. However, the difference is not statistically
significant. Also, the average settlement amount in the Second and Ninth
Circuits is not significantly different from the average settlement amounts
in the other circuits.
C. FIRM'S STOCK MARKET LISTING
Approximately 58% of the firms in our sample (303) have their shares
quoted in the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation ("NASDAQ") system, about 27% (143) are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), 8% (44) are traded in the over-the-
counter ("OTC") market, and only 2% (11) are listed on the American
Stock Exchange ("AMEX"). Table 4 reports the average settlement
amount based on the primary market for the shares of the firm accused of
the fraud. The average settlement amount involving NYSE firms is
statistically significantly greater than the average settlement amount for the
other firms in our sample. This is not surprising because the average
market capitalization of firms listed on the NYSE is greater than the
average market capitalization of the firms traded in other segments of the
U.S. stock market.
D. PRINCIPAL PLAINTIFF LAW FIRM
We also investigated whether the lead plaintiff law firm might affect
the size of the settlement amount. The Milberg Weiss law firm was the
dominant lead firm in the cases included in our sample, serving as the lead
42. See Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1029. (finding that there is significant variation in the
relationship between settlement amount and the amount of damages across judicial circuits).
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counsel in almost 39% (203) of the cases.43 Milberg Weiss may have
become so dominant with respect to the number of cases either because it is
able to achieve bigger settlements or because it is willing at times to take
on some of the relatively smaller cases. The results in Table 5 are more
consistent with the first interpretation. Milberg Weiss has been associated
with larger-than-average settlements, but so have the other two law firms in
Table 5.44 Although each law firm's average settlement amount is greater
than the average settlement amount for the other class actions in our
sample, none of the differences is statistically significant. Also, there is no
statistically significant difference in the average settlement amounts among
these three law firms.
E. INSIDERS NAMED, SECTION 11 VIOLATION, OR UNDERWRITERS NAMED
The PSLRA imposed a number of changes designed to reduce abusive
litigation and coercive settlements. It replaced joint and several liability
with proportionate liability for accountants and underwriters not directly
involved in the fraud, ended the race to the courthouse as the means of
determining the lead plaintiff law firm, stayed discovery pending a ruling
on the motion to dismiss, established the "90-day bounce-back" rule for
measuring damages, and imposed a higher pleading standard.45
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a
negligence standard for Rule 10b-5 claims and held that plaintiffs must
prove that the defendants acted with scienter.46 This standard requires that,
at least, the defendants acted recklessly in making the alleged
misstatements.47 The PSLRA elevated the pleading standard to require the
plaintiffs to plead the defendants' state of mind with particularity:
43. Joseph Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience: A Statistical and Legal Analysis of Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Stanford Law School Working Paper,
1998), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=10582. (finding that
the Milberg Weiss law firm's market share increased significantly nationwide but particularly
in California following the PSLRA).
44. The results reported in Table 5 indicate that each of the three firms has been
associated with settlements that are, on average, larger than the average settlement in those
cases in which they were not involved.
45. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 2, at 7; Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1102.
46. 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976).
47. Id. at 197. The plaintiffs must plead that the defendants made material misstatements
or omissions with scienter and that they were injured by their reliance on these
misstatements or omissions.
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In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.48
A typical allegation states that the firm's managers ignored generally
accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") for their own enrichment,
quantifies the profits they realized through the exercise of employee stock
options and sale of the shares, and names them as defendants. 49  The
presumption is that they had the motive to commit fraud and the
opportunity to do so.50 Table 6 reports that settlements of lawsuits naming
insiders as defendants have a greater average settlement amount than
lawsuits that do not name insiders, and that the difference is highly
statistically significant.
Asserting a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act and naming
the underwriters would also be expected to increase the amount of the
settlement. 51 A Section 11 claim may be asserted only if the alleged fraud
occurred in connection with a public offering of securities.52 Typically, the
Section 1 1 claim is in addition to a Rule 1Ob-5 claim, and so the asserted
damages must be at least as great. At least one study has found that
Section 11 settlements are directly related to the amount of estimated
damages.53 Table 6 reports that the average settlement amount is greater
either when a violation of Section 11 is alleged or when the underwriters
are named as defendants, but that the difference is not statistically
significant in either case.
F. GAAP/GAAS VIOLATION, AUDITORS NAMED, OR SEC INVESTIGATION
Congress's purpose in enacting the PSLRA was to discourage frivolous
lawsuits.54 A typical allegation states that the firm violated GAAP by
publishing financial statements that did not conform to those principles and
thereby intentionally misled the investing public.55 Allegations of GAAP
48. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 202 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
49. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 2, at 12.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k (2004).
52. Id.
53. See Bohn & Choi, supra note 4, at 30.
54. See Pritchard & Sale, supra note 2, at 12.
55. Id.
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violations have become more common post-PSLRA.56 This legal strategy
has some intuitive appeal because rules are meant to be followed and, if
they are not, a court could reasonably conclude that the defendants must
have knowingly made misleading statements about the firm's financial
condition or its performance.
A court could presumably draw an even stronger inference from an
alleged violation of GAAP if the firm's auditors or the SEC have forced it
to restate its financial results. In that case, we would expect the settlement
amount to be greater. The existence of an SEC investigation raises the
possibility that the SEC might order a restatement of the firm's financials.
The seriousness of the accounting violation would also be elevated if the
auditors were named as defendants-for example, by alleging that their
work violated generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS") by failing
to uncover the fraud. As reported in Table 7, the auditors were named as
defendants in only fifty-nine (11%) of the cases in our sample. At least one
other study has also found that the auditors are named in only a small
percentage of class action complaints.57
Table 7 tests the sensitivity of the settlement amount to each of these
three factors. More than one half the cases in the sample allege a violation
of GAAP/GAAS, more than 11% name the firm's auditors, and about one
sixth of the cases involve an SEC investigation. The average settlement
amount is significantly greater when the auditors are named as defendants,
when violations of GAAP/GAAS are alleged, and also when there is an
SEC investigation of the firm relating to the alleged fraud underway.58 In
each case, the test statistic is highly significant. The alleged violations of
GAAP/GAAS provide the strongest statistical results.
G. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Achieving class certification is usually an important milestone for the
plaintiffs. Counsel for the defendants usually mounts an aggressive
defense that includes challenging class certification when counsel believes
that the requirements of Rule 23 have not been satisfied.5 9 This rule
requires that in order for the court to certify a class of plaintiffs, the court
56. See Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1107.
57. Id. at 108.
58. Others have found that the settlement amount increases when accounting violations
are alleged, and also when the firm's auditors are named as defendants. Moreover,
accounting allegations have a greater impact on the settlement amount than other types of
allegations. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1024.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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must find that, among other prerequisites, the class is properly defined, its
claims are properly specified, the lead plaintiff(s) are qualified to represent
the class, the class is represented by competent counsel, and a class action
is the most appropriate means of prosecuting the matter.6 ° We expect that
achieving class certification increases the settlement value of a class action.
In our sample there are 270 cases for which we could verify that the
class was certified-that is, both certified for litigation and certified for
settlement. There are 235 cases for which we could verify that the class
was not certified. We tested the impact of class certification on the
settlement amount. As reported in Table 8, the average settlement amount
in the class actions for which we could verify that the class had been
certified by the court ($19,130,000) is actually less than the average
settlement amount for the remaining cases in our sample ($20,930,000).
However, this difference is not statistically significant. We suspect that
class certification is more likely in smaller cases because the defendants
will mount more vigorous defenses (including challenging class
certification) in larger cases where more is at stake. Nevertheless, the
class-certified cases in our sample do not appear to support the hypothesis
that the settlement amount increases when the class is certified.6'
H. DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS AND THE PSLRA
In the years immediately following enactment of the PSLRA, high-
technology firms were the most frequent targets of securities fraud class
action lawsuits.62 A third of the settlements (171) in the sample involve
high-technology firms, which are firms belonging to the computer, computer
chip, communication system manufacturing, software development, drug and
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries. We excluded firms belonging
to the retail sector of these industries. We tested whether settlements are
greater on average when they involve high-technology firms. As reported in
Table 8, we find that while settlements are actually smaller on average, the
difference is not statistically significant.63
60. Id. at 23(b) and 23(g).
61. This conclusion will change when the full model is developed. That model will control
for all the other factors that affect the settlement amount. When these factors are controlled
for, class certification is revealed to be a significant determinant of the settlement amount.
62. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 37, at 1.
63. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1027 (finding no significant differences in the median
settlement amounts across industries).
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As explained earlier in the article, the PSLRA established a higher
pleading standard by requiring plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter. In
the case of Rule lOb-5, plaintiffs must plead facts that give rise to a strong
inference that the defendants acted recklessly or with actual intent.64 The
PSLRA also requires the court to review a class action on the merits (after
the "final adjudication") and impose sanctions for frivolous litigation.65 Both
standards would be expected to result in higher costs of litigation, greater
case selectivity by attorneys, and higher settlements. In addition, general
inflation would tend to increase the amount of damage awards post-PSLRA.
On the other hand, the PSLRA reduced defendants' liability to
forward-looking statements and further reduced the potential liability
facing particular defendants by imposing proportionate damages for Rule
lOb-5 claims.66 Under the proportionate liability rule, defendants who do
not have actual knowledge of the fraud are liable only to the extent of their
percentage culpability for the fraud.67 This rule works to protect those
deep-pocket defendants, such as underwriters and auditors, who are remote
from the fraud because greater culpability is usually attributed to corporate
insiders. Where corporate insiders are of limited means, the proportionate
liability rule reduces the total damages plaintiffs can expect because the
remaining defendants are liable only up to 150% of the damages resulting
from their culpability (and not for the entire unpaid amount, as they
potentially were pre-PSLRA).68  The net effect of the PSLRA and
subsequent reforms is to moderate the increase in the amount of damage
awards that would otherwise have occurred.
We tested whether the average post-PSLRA settlement amount exceeds
the average pre-PSLRA settlement amount. As reported in Table 8, the
average settlement amount post-PSLRA ($20,840,000) is statistically
significantly greater than the average settlement amount pre-PSLRA
($1 1,5 10,000).69
64. See Choi, supra note 34, at 6.
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id. at 7.
67. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
68. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires corporate CEOs and CFOs to certify their
firms' financial statements, which raises the corporate insiders' potential culpability and
exacerbates the impact of the proportionate liability limitations under the PSLRA. See
Choi, supra note 34, at 7.
69. Bajaj et al., supra note 5, at 1020 (finding that the settlement amount increased
following the PSLRA).
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V. THE SETTLEMENT MODEL
Tables 3 through 8 identify six sets of factors and examine how each
factor individually affects the settlement amount in securities fraud class
action litigation. Next we combine these factors in a multivariate
settlement model, which can be used to predict a reasonable settlement
amount based on prior settlement experience. Multiple regression takes
into account the interactions among the explanatory variables. We perform
this analysis in two stages. First, we examine the interactions within each
set of factors to determine which variables within each set are most
significant statistically in explaining the settlement amount. Then we
combine the explanatory variables to form the settlement model.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the settlement amount, log
S, in equation (1). The logarithm of the aggregate damages estimated by
the PTM, log Dn in equation (1), is included as an independent variable in
each of the regressions. The impact of the U.S. judicial district in which
the class action is filed, which we investigated in Table 3, is indicated by a
set of ten dummy (or indicator) variables, one for each of districts one
through ten. The Eleventh Circuit is omitted. The dummy variable takes
on the value one if the class action was filed in the indicated district and is
zero otherwise. The coefficient measures the marginal impact of the case
being filed in the indicated judicial circuit rather than the Eleventh Circuit.
The effect of the stock market listing in Table 4 is captured by adding
four dummy variables (NYSE, NASDAQ, OTC, AMEX) that indicate the
primary market where the defendant firm's common stock is traded.70 The
variable takes on the value one if the indicated market is the stock's
primary market and is zero otherwise. The impact of the lead plaintiff law
firm in Table 5 is included by adding three dummy variables, one for each
law firm. The variable takes on the value one if the indicated law firm is
the lead plaintiff law firm and is zero otherwise. The effect of each of the
nine variables in Tables 6, 7, and 8 is measured by including nine dummy
variables. Each takes on the value one if the class action has the indicated
characteristic and is zero otherwise. For example, the value of the variable
GAAP/GAAS is one if the class action complaint includes an allegation
70. For example, many of the stocks listed on the NYSE also trade in the OTC market
but the NYSE is the primary market.
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that the defendant firm violated GAAP or its auditors violated GAAP or
GAAS, and it is zero if there is no such allegation.
B. LENGTH OF TIME TO SETTLE THE LITIGATION
There is one other variable in addition to those we have already
considered that we thought might be important in explaining the settlement
amount. At least one prior study has found that the settlement amount
tends to increase with the length of time it takes to settle the litigation.71
This empirical observation probably reflects the fact that larger, more
complex class actions are likely to take longer to settle and are also likely
to result in a larger settlement amount.72 It may also result from the
bargaining behavior of the counsel involved. Plaintiff counsel and
defendant counsel are likely to bargain harder when there is more at stake,
with the result that it takes longer to negotiate a settlement.
We added the number of years to settle the class action to the
regression model in equation (1) and refit the model. The estimated
relationship is
EQUATION (2)
logS, = 6.994 + 0.460logD, + 0.016Y, R 2 = 0.41
(12.23 "**) (15.30**) (0.30)
In equation (2), S,, is the settlement amount, D,, is the aggregate
damage amount estimated by the PTM, Yn is the number of years to settle
the case, and log is the natural logarithm. The first two coefficients are
statistically significant.73 The constant and the coefficient of Dn in equation
(2) are very similar to the values in equation (1), and the k 2 is nearly the
same for both equations. Equation (2) implies that a 10% increase in the
estimated aggregate damages leads to a 4.60% increase in the expected
settlement amount. It also implies that the settlement amount is positively
related to the length of time it takes to settle the case, which is consistent
with our expectation, but the coefficient of Yn is not statistically
significantly different from zero. We investigated this relationship further
and found that in our sample, several of the relatively large settlements
71. Bajaj, et al., supra note 5, at 1012.
72. Id. at 1012-13.
73. The regression constant and the coefficient of D, are significant at the 1% level, and
the coefficient of Yn is not significant at the 10% level, which means that there is more than
a one in ten chance that a t-statistic this large could occur if the length of time to settle the
class action has no effect on the settlement amount.
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were achieved quickly and several of the relatively small settlements took a
relatively long time, which accounts for the statistically insignificant
coefficient for Y,, in equation (2). Since this result is not statistically
significant, we did not include the time to settle in the regression models
described in the remainder of the article.
C. REGRESSION MODELS
We fit a series of multiple regression models to our sample data to test
the significance of the various explanatory factors. We report the results in
Table 9. Overall, we find that the PTM aggregate damage estimate is the
single most important explanatory variable and that our models can explain
up to 56% of the settlement amount. Regression 1 in Table 9 is equation
(1). As we have noted, it can explain 42% of the settlement amount by
itself. Because of its importance, we include the PTM aggregate damage
estimate ("Log PSD") in all of the regression models. The regression
constant and the coefficient of Log PSD are highly statistically significant
in all the regression models.74
Regression 2 measures the incremental importance of the U.S. judicial
circuit in which the class action is filed in determining the settlement
amount. Including the judicial circuit improves the fit of the model
slightly. Class actions filed in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have greater average settlements with highly significant regression
coefficients, 75 and the Fifth and Seventh Circuit cases also have greater
average settlements but the regression coefficient is only marginally
significant.76  Adding the judicial circuits as independent variables
improves the explanatory power of the regression model to 45% from 42%.
Regression 3 tests the incremental contribution of the firm's stock
market listing to the settlement amount. Including the stock listing also
improves the fit of the model slightly. The stock listing variable interacts
with the regression constant, which is greater and more significant
statistically in regression 3 than in regression 1. The coefficient of the
stock listing variable is negative in each case except NYSE, and the
74. The regression coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
75. The regression coefficients are significant at the 1% level, which means that there is
only a one in one hundred chance that a t-statistic this large (2.576 or greater) would occur if
filing the class action in the above circuits has no effect on the settlement amount.
76. The regression coefficients are significant at the 10% level, which means that there is
only a one in ten chance that a t-statistic this large (1.645 or greater) would occur if filing
the class action in the Fifth or Seventh Circuit has no effect on the settlement amount.
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coefficients of the NASDAQ and the OTC variables are highly statistically
significant. 7 The coefficient of the NYSE variable, though positive, is not
statistically significant. These results are consistent with those reported in
Table 4 in that NYSE firms are involved in the largest settlements.
Regression 4 measures the added contribution of the lead plaintiff law
firm to the settlement amount. Wolf Popper is the only one of the three
firms with a statistically significant regression coefficient.78 This result is
surprising because all three law firms were associated with better-than-
average settlements in Table 5. However, the regression model adjusts for
the estimated damage amount. After adjusting for the PTM estimate of
damages, Wolf Popper is the only one of the three lead plaintiff law firms
that achieved significantly above-average settlements.
Regression 5 measures the impact of including insiders or underwriters
among the defendants and the impact of alleging violation of Section 11
under the Securities Act. None of these variables affects the settlement
amount significantly. The insignificance of insiders conflicts with Table 6
where naming the insiders resulted in a significantly greater settlement
amount. However, the regression coefficient is not statistically significant,
and thus, this variable has no effect on the settlement amount when the
PTM damage estimate is taken into account.
Regression 6 measures the added contribution of a GAAP/GAAS
violation, the inclusion of auditors among the defendants, and the
incremental importance of whether the SEC is investigating the defendant
firm in connection with the alleged fraud. GAAP/GAAS violations and
naming the auditors add very significantly to the settlement amount. 79 The
additional impact of an SEC investigation on the settlement amount is also
statistically significant. 80  These results are consistent with the relative
importance of these variables as indicated in Table 7. Adding these three
variables to the regression model increases the explanatory power, as
measured by the adjusted R-squared, to 47.6%.
Regression 7 measures the significance of whether the defendant firm
is a high-technology firm, whether the class action was filed pre-PSLRA or
post-PSLRA, and whether the class has been certified by the court.
77. The regression coefficient is significant at the 1% level for NASDAQ and at the 5%
level for OTC.
78. The regression coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
79. The regression coefficients of GAAP/GAAS and Auditors are both significant at the
1% level.
80. The regression coefficient of the SEC investigation variable is significant at the 5% level.
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Achieving class certification and filing post-PSLRA are both highly
significant factors. 81 The significance of class certification confirms our
initial expectation. The coefficient of this variable continues to be
statistically significant in the full model, which is discussed later in the
article.82  Controlling for the other factors that affect class action
settlements reveals that class certification is a significant milestone that
increases the defendants' cost of settling.
The coefficient of post-PSLRA, though statistically significant, has the
wrong sign. We believe that the larger settlements post-PSLRA are the
result of the greater damages, whose effect is captured by the variable Log
PSD measuring the PTM damage estimate. The PSLRA seems to have
reduced the filing of smaller, less significant lOb-5 cases. Consistent with
this explanation, the coefficient of post-PSLRA is statistically insignificant in
the full model. Finally, the coefficient of High-Tech Firm has the opposite
sign from what we expected, but it is only marginally significant.83
Regression 8 measures the incremental contributions of the nine factors
in Tables 6, 7, and 8. The model explains more than 5 1% of the variation
in the settlement amount. Five variables are consistently significant
statistically. Class actions that allege GAAP/GAAS violation(s), that name
the auditors as defendants, that involve an SEC investigation, and that
achieve class certification, lead to greater-than-average settlements even
after adjusting for the PTM estimate of aggregate damages and all the other
factors in Tables 6, 7, and 8.84 The coefficient of High-Tech Firm is
significant, but is negative. The coefficient of High-Tech Firm is not
statistically significantly different from zero in the full model.
Nevertheless, high-technology firm class actions appear to have smaller
settlements than other class actions after controlling for all the other factors
that affect settlements. Including the auditors among the defendants and
alleging GAAP/GAAS violations are the most significant of the nine
variables in Tables 6, 7, and 8, presumably because they signify the
81. Both regression coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
82. It is significant at the 5% level in the full model.
83. It is significant at the 10% level.
84. The coefficients of the auditor variable and the GAAP/GAAS variable are significant
at the 1% level. The coefficients of the SEC investigation variable and the class
certification variable are significant at the 5% level.
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seriousness of the alleged fraud but also because adding the auditors as
defendants includes a deep-pocket defendant.85
Regressions 9 and 10 combine all the explanatory variables we considered.
Regression 10 excludes the Cendant settlement because we wanted to
determine whether this extraordinarily large settlement might be biasing the
coefficients. Regressions 9 and 10 explain about 56% of the variation in the
settlement amount. The PTM damage estimate (Log PSD); the Third, Sixth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuit indicators; the Wolf Popper indicator, the
GAAP/GAAS indicator, and the auditor indicator are highly statistically
significant; 86 the Second Circuit indicator and the class certification indicator
are also significant; 87 and the Tenth Circuit indicator, the OTC indicator, and
the SEC investigation indicator are marginally significant.
88
Securities fraud class action settlements increase with the amount of
damages to which plaintiffs believe they might be entitled (Log PSD in the
model). They are greater in cases of more serious securities fraud, in which
violations of GAAP/GAAS are alleged, the auditors are named, and the
SEC has begun an investigation. They are also greater when they occur
after the class has been certified. Settlements of cases filed in the Second,
Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are generally greater than
with cases filed in the other circuits. Other things being equal, Wolf
Popper seems to be able to achieve above-average settlements. Finally,
settlements involving firms whose stocks trade OTC are generally smaller
than settlements involving firms with exchange-listed stocks.
VI. CONCLUSION
We obtained a sample of 525 securities fraud class action settlements
that were achieved between 1994 and 2005, of which 485 involve class
actions that were filed after January 1, 1996, the effective date of the
PSLRA. We identified a set of factors that play a significant role in
determining the settlement amount. The plaintiff-style estimate of the
aggregate shareholder damages, estimated by applying the PTM, is the single
most important variable in explaining these settlement amounts. By itself it
is capable of explaining about 42% of the variation in settlement amounts.
85. The PSLRA reduced the auditors' potential exposure, however. See supra Section
IV, part E.
86. The regression coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
87. The regression coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
88. The regression coefficients are significant at the 10% level.
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We find that in addition to the estimated amount of plaintiff-style
damages, the settlement amount increases when there is an alleged
violation of GAAP or GAAS, the defendant firm's outside auditors are also
named as defendants, and the SEC is investigating. The coefficients of the
GAAP/GAAS and auditor variables are highly statistically significant.
These factors suggest that the fraud is more serious because it involves
violations of generally accepted auditing and accounting standards, and
allegedly involves mistakes by the auditors. The existence of an SEC
investigation of the defendant firm also leads to a marginally significant
increase in the settlement amount, presumably because it lends credibility
to some of the complaint's allegations.
We also find that class certification is a significant milestone, the
achievement of which tends to increase the settlement amount. Further, we
find that six judicial circuits, and notably the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and
Ninth, have significantly larger settlements than the other circuits.89
However, defendants whose common shares trade in the OTC market tend
to achieve significantly smaller settlements even after adjusting for the size
of the plaintiffs' damage estimate and all the other factors we considered.
Our settlement model explains 56% of the variation in the settlement
amount within our sample. We excluded the very large Cendant settlement
in the final estimation of the model and found that there was only a small
impact on the parameter estimates. We feel comfortable recommending the
model's use for all securities fraud class actions regardless of the amount of
potential damages.
89. We also find that if the law firm Wolf Popper serves as the lead plaintiff law firm, the
coefficient is highly positively significant.
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Table 9: Regression Models for Settlement Amount with all Variables
Dependent Variable for all Regressions is Log of Settlement Amount
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10a
Intercept 6.959"" 6.097"'" 7.833"'" 6.917"'" 6.974"" 7.129"'" 6.849"'" 6.854"'" 6.558"" 6.751"
(12.28) (10.22) (12.67) (12.43) (11.45) (12.93) (11.78) (11.42) (9.60) (9.92)
Log PSD 0.465- 0.476"'" 0.437"'" 0.464"'" 0.465 " °  0.437"" 0.497"'" 0.469- 0.450" 0.444""
(15.62) (16.28) (14.52) (15.68) (15.54) (15.12) (17.02) (16.25) (15.29) (15.16)
First Circuit 0.184 0.312 0.302
(.60) (1.10) (1.08)
Second Circuit 0.901 - 0.578"" 0.584""
(3.32) (2.33) (2.38)
Third Circuit 0.957"'" 0.863"'" 0.756"'"
(3.30) (3.26) (2.85)
Fourth Circuit -0.090 -0.165 -0.170
(-.20) (-.40) (-.41)
Fifth Circuit 0.546" 0.447 0.451
(1.74) (1.55) (1.58)
Sixth Circuit 1.121 1.002- 1.001"*
(3.26) (3.26) (3.29)
Seventh Circuit 0.563" 0.466 0.458
(1.80) (1.62) (1.61)
Eighth Circuit 1.356"" 1.417- 1.382"'"
(3.22) (3.69) (3.63)
Ninth Circuit 0.728- 0.782"'" 0.767"'"
(3.02) (3.54) (3.51)
Tenth Circuit 0.532 0.606" 0.586"
(I.46) (1.80) (1.76)
NYSE 0.036 0.193 0.156
(.19) (1.09) (.88)
NASDAQ -0.518"" -0.241 -0.255
(-2.76) (-1.31) (-1.41)
OTC -0.704" -0.495" -0.512"
(-2.16) (-I.67) (-1.74)
AMEX -0.478 -0.194 -0.209
(-.87) (-.38) (-.41)
Milberg Weiss 0.029 0-043 0.013
(.23) (.35) (.11)
Wolf Popper 1.059"* 0.639- 0.677"'"
(4.09) (2.64) (2.83)
Berger Montague -0.025 -0.112 -0.066
(-.11) (-.54) (-.32)
Insiders Named -0.058 -0.078 -0.024 -0.017
(-.20) (-.29) (-.09) (-.07)
Underwriters Named 0.114 0.023 0.005 0.013
(.41) (.09) (.02) (.05)
Section 11 Indicator 0.260 0.281 0.217 0.234
(1.12) (1.33) (1.06) (1.15)
Auditors Named 0.644- 0.557"'" 0.606"'" 0.551*
(3.09) (2.69) (2.98) (2.72)
GAAP/GAAS Violation 0.368"'" 0.337"" 0.335" 0.332""
(2.86) (2.64) (2.69) (2.69)
SEC Investigation 0.378*.  0.329"" 0.278" 0.250
(2.34) (2.06) (1.77) (1.60)
High-Tech Firm -0.250" -0.251I" -0.144 -0.123
(-1.93) (-2.01) (-1.07) (-.93)
Class Certification 0.336"" 0.251"" 0.261- 0.249""
(2.72) (2.10) (2.24) (2.16)
Post-PSLRA -0.640"" -0319 -0.287 -0.310
(-2.60) (-.12) (-1.12) (-1.23)
N 337 337 337 337 337 337 330 330 330 329
Adj. Ri 0.4198 0.4514 0.4412 0.4431 0.4192 0.4758 0.4705 0.5119 0.5649 0.5531
D-W Stat 1.9991 2.0504 1.9352 1.9330 2.0516 1.9477 1.9553 1.9639 1.9666 2.0163
Excluding Cendant Corp. t-statistics in parentheses.
statistically significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in two-tailed test.
